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Summary  
In the UK social protection, including the National Health Service (NHS), is funded out of 
general taxation and National Insurance contributions (NICs). There is no necessary link 
between changes to taxation and social protection provided. This makes it more difficult to 
trace the connection between sources of financing and social protection in the UK. 
One source of revenue is National Insurance contributions. A record of paying NICS is 
required to qualify for the state pension, contributory Job Seeker’s Allowance, contributory 
Employment and Support Allowance, maternity allowance and Bereavement Benefit but 
not the NHS. There is a separate National Insurance Fund for contributory benefits 
including the state pension, the level of which is overseen by the Government Actuary. In 
addition to employee and employer NICs, there is also a contribution from general taxation 
to the NI Fund, which was abolished after 1988/89 and then reinstated in 1993/94. 
Although contribution records (including credited contributions) govern entitlement to the 
benefits listed above, the amount of benefit is not related to either contributions paid or 
the level of earnings (except in the state pension, which still has earnings-related elements 
that are being phased out).  
General tax revenue is provided by direct and indirect taxes. Direct taxes on income are 
broadly progressive and indirect taxes on consumption are broadly regressive. The overall 
tax system is broadly proportional. There have been no substantial changes in the level of 
taxation since 2005; but there have been many reforms, including contrasting real 
increases in personal tax allowances but not in the NICs threshold. 
Overall public expenditure has fallen as a percentage of GDP. Expenditure on social security 
rose after 2005/06 but has been falling since 2012/13 as a percentage of GDP. Most of the 
reduction in social security spending has come from working age benefits, including 
unemployment benefits, housing benefits and family benefits. Spending on disability 
benefits has risen and spending on pensions is more or less stable. 
The main driver of change has been policy. Demographic changes have been small. 
Unemployment rose after 2005/06 and then fell rapidly after 2011/12. Real earnings fell 
after the crisis, but the minimum wage has been increasing faster than average wages. 
Rents have risen. The main policy changes influencing spending have been the freeze and 
the many cuts to working age benefits and increases in the state pension age. There has 
also been an increase in the qualifying years required for a (new) state pension. 
Since 2005/06 real spending on the health service has increased and it has not fallen as a 
percentage of GDP. However, modelling indicates that health spending needs to increase 
by 4% per year to maintain the real level, given technical advances and the ageing of the 
population, which has not happened since 2010. Pressures on spending have been 
exacerbated by cuts in social care spending and both process and outcome indicators show 
that the health service is failing.  
The major problem is not the mix of tax revenues but the political decision in 2010 to 
reduce the deficit largely by cuts in expenditure rather than by increasing taxes. In fact, 
the thresholds for paying direct taxes have been increased in real terms. 
The results are now “inflicting unnecessary misery in one of the richest countries in the 
world” (UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights 2018).  
Social protection spending needs to increase and thus taxation needs to rise to fund it.  
There are debates about big reforms such as a hypothecated tax for the NHS, or a basic 
income to replace benefits and direct tax allowances. There is also an ongoing debate and 
consultation about the entitlement of the self-employed to contributory benefits, and about 
the administrative integration of NICs with income tax. 
The paper suggests 10 reforms to the existing tax and NICs system in order to raise more 
revenue and make the UK system more redistributive. 
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1 Current levels and past changes in financing social protection  
ESSPROS data 
ESSPROS data summarised in Table 1 indicates that expenditure on social protection rose 
from 24.8% of GDP in 2005 to 28.9% in 2011 and then fell to 26.2% in 2016. It shows 
that in 2005 29.5% of social protection expenditure went on sickness/health, 39.8% on 
old age and 30.7% on other areas. By 2016 the percentages were 32.6%, 41.9% and 
25.5%. Within other areas, expenditure on disability, survivors, unemployment, and social 
exclusion all fell between 2005 and 2016, while expenditure on family and housing benefit 
increased. It shows that the share of expenditure on means-tested benefits increased from 
14.6% in 2005 to 21.4% in 2010 and then fell to 17.6% in 2016. In 2015 the effective tax 
and contributions rate was 3.4% from tax unchanged since 2007. The division of financing 
for net social expenditure in 2007 was 38.1% social contributions, 44.4% government and 
17.5% other. By 2015 it was 36.1%, 49.6% and 14.3% respectively.  In 2013 0.1% was 
tax expenditures, 0.9% mandatory private social expenditure and a net contribution after 
paying tax of 0.9%.  
Table 1: ESSPROS data on expenditure in the UK "Statistical annex on financing 
social protection: levels and structure (2005-2016)" 
 
   Year 
Share of gross 
expenditure on social 
protection in total 
GDP, 2005-2016 
Gross expenditure on 
social protection in 
real terms (i.e. at 
constant 2005 prices), 
2005-2016  
Share of expenditure 
on means-tested 
benefits, 2005-2016 
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
 
2005 24.8 100 14.6 
2006 24.8 102 14.5 
2007 24.6 104.2 20.2 
2008 25.7 107 20.8 
2009 28.4 113.6 21.4 
2010 28.8 117 21.3 
2011 28.9 117.8 20.8 
2012 28.9 119.5 20.2 
2013 28.3 119.3 19.4 
2014 27.5 119.1 18.6 
2015 27.6 122.8 17.7 
2016 26.2 119.2 17.6 
 
 
  
  
PERCENTAGE POINT CHANGE 
2005-2008 2008-2010 2010-2016 2005-2016 
Share of gross 
expenditure on social 
protection in total GDP, 
2005-2016 
0.9 3.1 -2.6 1.4 
Gross expenditure on 
social protection in real 
terms (i.e. at constant 
2005 prices), 2005-2016  
2.3 4.6 0.3 1.6 
Share of expenditure on 
means-tested benefits, 
2005-2016 
6.2 0.5 -3.7 3 
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% OF GDP %-point difference 
Gross expenditure Net expenditure Net minus gross 
  2007 2010 2015 2007 2010 2015 2007 2010 2015 
Gross and net 
social protection 
expenditure 
24.7 29 27.7 23.8 28 26.8 -0.9 -1 -0.9 
 
  
  
% of gross social protection expenditure 
2007 2010  2015 
  Tax Contr
ib. 
Sum Tax Contr
ib. 
Sum Tax Contr
ib. 
Sum 
Effective tax 
and social 
contribution 
rates on social 
protection 
expenditure 
3.4 0 3.4 3.4 0 3.4 3.4 0 3.4 
 
  % of total receipts 
2007 2010 2015 
 Social 
contrib. 
General 
goverm
ment 
Other Social 
contrib. 
General 
goverm
ment 
Other Social 
contrib. 
General 
goverm
ment 
Other 
Division of financing 
for net social 
protection 
expenditure by main 
source, 2007-2015 
38.1 44.4 17.5 41.5 40.7 17.9 36.1 49.6 14.3 
  
Difference in % of total receipts, net minus gross 
2007 2010 2015 
 
Social 
contrib. 
General 
govermm
ent 
Social 
contrib. 
General 
govermm
ent 
Social 
contrib. 
General 
govermm
ent 
Division of 
financing for net 
social protection 
expenditure by 
main source, 
2007-2015 
1 -1.5 1.3 -1.8 1 -1.4 
 
  tax 
expenditures 
mandatory 
private social 
expenditure 
taxes+contribu
tions on 
mandatory 
expenditure 
net mandatory 
private 
expenditure 
Tax 
expenditures 
and mandatory 
private social 
expenditure, 
2013 
0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 
Source: Spasova and Ward (2019), Annex ESSPROS tables.1  
 
                                                 
1 Spasova S. and Ward T. (2019). Social protection expenditure and its financing in Europe, A study of national 
policies 2019, European Social Policy Network (ESPN), Brussels: European Commission. 
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National data 
National data have the advantage over ESSPROS data of being more up-to-date. ESSPROS 
currently takes us to 2016 or 2015; but many of the biggest cuts in social protection have 
taken place after the election of the Conservative Government in 2015 and a large 
proportion are not yet fully implemented. The ESSPROS data are also difficult to interpret 
and understand in the context of the fact that social protection in the UK is largely funded 
out of general tax revenue rather than social contributions. 
1.1 Expenditure 
Figure 1 shows that public expenditure has grown in nominal and real terms since 2005/06 
(left hand axis); but it has fallen as a proportion of GDP (right hand axis), from 39.7% in 
2010/11 to 34.2% in 2016/17. But of course not all that expenditure is devoted to social 
protection.  
Figure 1: Public expenditure trends 2005/6 to 2016/17 
 
Source: Own calculations from HM Treasury, Public Expenditure Statistical analysis 2018. 
 
The main focus of this report is social protection, including pensions and health care. So 
we will first explore social security expenditure in more detail. It can be seen in Table 2 
that expenditure on social protection benefits as a percentage of GDP rose after 2005/06 
to 9.7% by 2012/13 and then fell to 8.3% (forecast) for 2019/20. Expenditure on children 
fell after 2010, on working age people2 it rose until 2012/13 and then fell, and even 
spending on pensioners as a proportion of GDP has been falling since 2014/15. Table 3 
breaks that down further and shows trends in spending in 2017/18 real terms since 
2013/14. Overall, social protection spending has fallen by more than £7 €8.3 billion per 
year. Most of that has been the result of falls in spending on unemployment benefits, 
housing benefit and family benefits. In contrast, spending on disability benefits has risen 
and spending on pensions has remained stable. 
  
                                                 
2 Basically non-pensioners receiving social protection 
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Table 2 Benefit expenditure, as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
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Children 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Working age 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 2.7% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 2.7% 2.7% 2.8% 2.7% 2.6% 
Pensioners 5.3% 5.2% 5.3% 5.8% 6.2% 6.2% 6.3% 6.4% 6.2% 6.2% 6.1% 5.9% 5.8% 5.7% 5.6% 5.5% 
Contributory 4.3% 4.2% 4.3% 4.6% 5.0% 5.0% 5.1% 5.2% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.0% 5.0% 4.9% 4.9% 4.8% 
Income-
related 
2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 2.6% 2.5% 2.4% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 2.0% 2.0% 
Non-
contributory / 
non-income-
related 
1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.5% 1.5% 
Total 
  
8.2% 8.0% 8.1% 8.7% 9.6% 9.5% 9.6% 9.7% 9.2% 9.1% 9.0% 8.7% 8.6% 8.6% 8.4% 8.3% 
 Source: HM Treasury Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis 2018. 
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Table 3 Public sector expenditure on services by sub-function, 2013-14 to 
2017-18 £3million 2017-18 real terms 
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of which: personal social services 31081 31727 31639 31681 31651 
10.1 Sickness and disability 50853 52574 55363 54390 55192 
10.2 Old age 123970 124286 124838 123963 124327 
10.3 Survivors 1231 1209 1213 1177 1019 
10.4 Family and children 26715 26467 26341 25365 24334 
10.5 Unemployment 5363 3640 2804 2265 2022 
10.6 Housing 28659 27695 27246 25588 24138 
10.7 Social exclusion (family 
benefits and tax credits) 
34735 33633 33365 32844 33033 
10.9 Social protection n.e.c. 3901 4121 4111 4339 4177 
Total social protection 275428 273625 275282 269930 268241 
Extracted Table 5.2 Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis 2018 using GDP deflators given in Table f1. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/726871/P
ESA_2018_Accessible.pdf 
1.1.1 Drivers of changes in social protection spending 
Demographic 
The number of recipients of the basic state pension rose from 11.59 million in 2005/06 to 
12.96 million in 2014/15 but since then it has fallen to 12.55 million (2019/20). Part of 
this is due to policy change, particularly increases in the pensionable age (see below); but 
ageing in the UK is on something of a plateau as we await the 1960s baby boom generation 
reaching pension age towards the end of the 2020s. Despite more pensioners living to 
older ages there is no evidence that this has driven up the number of recipients of 
attendance allowance (non-means-tested benefit given for the additional costs of disability 
for those over pension age) – indeed, the number has fallen over the period. 
The number of children in the population has been falling over the period, and the number 
receiving child benefit has fallen from 13.1 million to 12.8 million, which partly explains 
the fall in expenditure on benefits for children. The fertility rate has been below the 
replacement rate (slightly above 2 births per woman) over the whole period.  
Family structure has continued to change, with an increasing proportion of households 
being single, both with and without children, which might be expected to drive up public 
expenditure, especially on housing and potentially social protection. However, there has 
also been a recent and dramatic reduction in teenage conceptions, and a sharp increase in 
the proportion of lone-parent families in employment, both of which are likely to drive 
down social protection expenditure.  
Economic 
Undoubtedly the labour market has been a key determinant of changes in social protection 
expenditure. Following the global economic crisis, unemployment increased sharply and 
the number of recipients of unemployment benefit (jobseeker’s allowance) increased from 
870,000 in 2005/06 to 1.52 million by 2011/12; but since then it has dropped rapidly, to 
604,000 in 2018/19. However, despite this decline in unemployment, there has been no 
                                                 
3 £1=€1.18 
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diminution in the numbers of working age people receiving incapacity benefit/employment 
and support allowance, which has been one of the main reasons why expenditure on 
disability (including incapacity) benefits has increased. 
The other economic factor that might have been expected to influence social protection 
expenditure is what has been happening to earnings. The bulk of in-work benefits are 
means tested and thus, if earnings increase in the largely means-tested system in the UK, 
benefit expenditure falls. While there has been a long period following the crisis when real 
earnings fell (with public sector pay frozen and then subject to a 1% per annum cap), 
earnings at the bottom end of the distribution have risen recently, thanks to real increases 
in the statutory minimum wage, the new, increased ‘national living wage’ for those aged 
25 or more, and a small but increasing proportion of employers adopting the (higher) 
‘voluntary living wage’.4 
Finally, housing construction recovered more slowly from the global financial crisis than 
housing prices.5 The under-supply of social housing means that many more people, in 
particular families with children, are having to live in private rented accommodation, which 
being more expensive than social housing pushes up social expenditure on housing benefit. 
This increase has only been controlled by limits on the amount of private rents covered by 
housing benefit. 
Policy 
Given that demographic pressures have been broadly benign, that unemployment is at a 
near record low,6 and that low earnings have been increasing faster than average earnings, 
the main driver of changes in social protection expenditure has mainly been policy. 
After the banking crisis began in 2008, the Labour Government’s response was generally 
anti-cyclical – benefit upratings were maintained and brought forward, and taxes were 
increased on the better off. Child poverty continued to fall despite a sharp increase in 
unemployment. When the Coalition Government came to power in 2010, it reversed these 
measures and set out to reduce the deficit and cut public expenditure as a proportion of 
GDP. The measures were initially designed to take 80% from spending and 20% in 
increased taxation; but in the event almost all of it has been taken from spending, because 
the Coalition chose to raise personal tax allowances in real terms, including raising the 
higher rate threshold.7   
Some benefits were abolished, whilst working age benefits were uprated by the Consumer 
Price Index rather than the higher Retail Price Index. Limits to housing benefit were 
imposed, including the ‘bedroom tax’ (or ‘abolition of the spare room subsidy’ in social 
housing, as the government called this). Public sector pay was frozen. Huge cuts were 
made in services, particularly local government services. Having won the 2015 General 
Election, the Conservatives announced a whole new raft of cuts, including freezing working 
age benefits, cutting universal credit, lowering the benefit cap (the maximum in means-
tested benefits for families) and introducing the two-child limit for tax credits and universal 
credit.  
£37 (€35.2) billion per annum (real terms, 2018/19 prices) will have been taken from 
social security and tax credits spending, excluding the state pension and pension credit, 
by 2020/21 – roughly 23% of what total expenditure might have been had these measures 
                                                 
4 A minimum wage higher than the statutory minimum wage / national living wage, which is based on a 
Minimum Income Standard, i.e. averaging modest costs of living for different kinds of households with assumed 
hours of paid work for the adult(s). 
5 Pittini, A., Koessl, G., Dijol, J., Lakatos, E. and Ghekiere, L. (2017) The state of housing in the EU 2018, 
Brussels: Housing Europe 
6 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/u
klabourmarket/december2018#unemployment  
7 http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case/_new/research/Social_Policy_in_a_Cold_Climate/Programme_Reports_and_event_information.asp 
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not been implemented,8 (or about £10,000 (€11200) (€12544) per child until about 2019–
20), leaving it at about the same level in real terms as in 2006/07.9 However, the autumn 
2018 Budget announced that the largest cut made in UC – to the work allowance – would 
be reversed for families with children and those with limited capability to work, meaning 
that the allowance (disregard) would be increased by £1000 (€1120) per year.  
There have been many analyses of the cumulative distributional consequences of these 
measures, most recently by Reed and Portes for the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission.10 The conclusions are clear: the lowest income deciles have had the biggest 
losses; the poorest local authorities have suffered the biggest revenue losses; the cuts 
have hit the incomes of families with children most. Poor lone parents are the biggest 
losers and rich pensioners have hardly been touched. There is more to come – benefits are 
frozen until 2020, and Universal Credit and the two-child limit are still being rolled out. 
 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies11 estimates that child poverty rates will now rise rapidly to 
2021 and beyond, effectively sweeping away all the gains made in poverty reduction after 
1999. Wages at the bottom of the distribution have recently been rising more rapidly than 
the average, thanks to improvements in the statutory minimum wage (especially the 
‘national living wage’), and the unemployment rate at 4.1% is at a near record low. So, it 
is not wages nor unemployment driving up poverty. It is austerity policies. 
The cuts have not been successful in eradicating the deficit in the public finances. In March 
2018, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)12  forecast a deficit of £21.4 €35 billion in 
2022/23, saying that it expected the deficit to move below 2 per cent of GDP in 2018/19 
and then to fall slowly over the four years to 2022/23. One important reason why more 
deficit reduction has not been achieved is that the public expenditure cuts were offset by 
cuts in income and other taxes. Nor has the strategy been successful in raising economic 
growth - the economy has been growing, but by only 0.4% in the second quarter of 2018. 
The OBR revised its GDP growth forecast down to 1.5% for 2018,13 and to 1.2% for 2019.14 
As well as the general austerity measures, the government has taken three other steps to 
control or reduce social protection spending: 
1. The introduction of Personal Independence Payment (PIP) to replace Disability 
Living Allowance and the new enhanced assessment regime and conditionality for 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) have certainly caused hassle and 
hardship for disabled people. They may have resulted in slowing the increase in 
expenditure, but they have not succeeded in reducing total expenditure (despite 
the declared aim to cut spending on PIP by 20% compared to DLA) and the numbers 
of recipients of both PIP and ESA have risen.15 
2. The Coalition Government sought to reduce the costs of child benefit by introducing 
a High Income Child Benefit (tax) Charge. It arises when a lone parent or a partner 
in a couple claims Child Benefit in respect of one or more children. If the income of 
the lone parent, or one of the partners (whether the couple are married or in a civil 
partnership) exceeds £50,000 €59,000 ‘adjusted net income’ per year, they become 
liable to the High Income Child Benefit Charge, which claws back 1% of the total 
Child Benefit received for each £100 €118 of income above £50,000 €59,000, until 
all of it is withdrawn at £60,000 €69690. Since the total amount of Child Benefit 
                                                 
8 ‘Welfare savings 2010-11 to 2020-21’, House of Commons Library Briefing paper CBP 7667, 26 July 2017 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7667  
9 https://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Public-Spending-on-Children-in-
England-CCO-JUNE-2018.pdf 
10 https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/cumulative-impact-assessment-report.pdf 
11 https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/10030  
12  http://obr.uk/efo/economic-fiscal-outlook-march-2018/  
13  http://obr.uk/efo/economic-fiscal-outlook-march-2018/  
14 https://cdn.obr.uk/ExecSummary_March_2019.pdf  
15 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/benefit-expenditure-tables  
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received depends on both the benefit rate and the number of children, and the 
income range for withdrawal is fixed at £10,000 €11,800, the implied marginal tax 
rates for larger families with an earner at this level can be well over 60%.16 It is 
estimated that1 in 5 families with children will lose at least some child benefit by 
2022.17 
3. Since the June 2010 Budget, the Basic State Pension has been uprated using the 
‘triple lock’ - the highest of CPI inflation or average earnings growth or 2.5% each 
year. The triple lock has resulted in a big improvement in the real level of the 
pension, and especially in comparison with earnings, since the start of the 
recession.18 However, the government has sought to control pension expenditure 
in the future. The new State Pension was introduced from April 2016 at a slightly 
higher level for people retiring after that date. But it also increased the qualifying 
years for contributions: the number of qualifying years required to claim the full 
pension rises to 35 years, and includes a minimum qualifying period, of 10 years.19  
The new State Pension is based on individual contributions and people will not be 
able to claim on their spouse’s (or civil partner’s) contributions at retirement, or if 
they are widowed or divorced. The Pensions Act 2011 raised the state pension age 
(SPA) for women progressively from 60 to 65 by 2018, and for both men and women 
to 66 between 2018 and 2020. The Work and Pensions Select Committee heard 
evidence that confusion is rife, including amongst some women who realised very 
late that receipt of their state pension was years further away than they had thought 
and planned for. WASPI (Women against State Pension Inequality) has been formed 
to campaign for better transitional arrangements.  
It was intended that in future the state pension age was to be reviewed every six 
years and raised in line with developments in life expectancy.20 The Government 
was planning to raise the state pension age from 66 to 67 between 2026 and 2028. 
However, this has now been overtaken by the Cridland review,21 which pointed out 
that, between now and 2036/37, annual state pension spending is set to rise by an 
extra 1% of GDP, from 5.2% to 6.2%. The review recommended raising the SPA 
from 67 to 68 by 2039, seven years earlier than the previous timetable suggested. 
In July 2017, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions announced22 that the 
Government intends to follow the recommendations of Cridland and increase the 
SPA from 67 to 68 in 2037–39. The increase in the pension age has been announced 
coincidentally at the same time as evidence has emerged that life expectancy has 
stalled since 2010; it has been judged entirely possible that f austerity has had an 
impact on this.23 
The main question about the future adequacy of the state pension concerns how it 
will be indexed.24 There is a statutory requirement to index at least in line with 
earnings. The means-tested Pension Credit has been uprated in line with the CPI. 
                                                 
16 Recovery of Child Benefit adds 10.8% to the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate for one child, 17.9% for two 
children and 25% for three children. This means that an individual with three children and an ‘adjusted net 
income’ between £50,000 and £60,000 per year faces a marginal tax rate over that range of 65%. 
17 https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/13791 
18 Bradshaw, J. (2017) Trends in pensioner incomes, Blog: 
http://jonathanbradshaw.blogspot.co.uk/2017/12/trends-in-pensioner-poverty.html  
19 Until 2010, a person was not entitled to any basic state pension if they did not have enough qualifying years 
to be entitled to at least 25% of the full rate. This meant 10 years for a woman and 11 for a man, due to the 
difference in male and female state pension age.   
20 Chancellor's Autumn Statement 5 Dec. 2013: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/autumn-
statement-2013-documents, p. 89 point 2.72 
21 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/state-pension-age-independent-review-final-report 
22 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/630065/state-pension-age-
review-final-report.pdf  
23 http://www.ucl.ac.uk/iehc/iehc-news/michael-marmot-life-expectancy  
24 http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05649    
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In the 2017 election manifesto, the Conservatives promised to maintain the triple 
lock until 2020 and then replace it with a double lock (prices or earnings rises). 
However, the 26 June 2017 agreement between the Conservative and Democratic 
Unionist Parties said that both parties had agreed “no change to Pensions Triple 
Lock”. The House of Commons Library estimates25 that in 2015/16 the basic state 
pension was 14% higher in nominal terms than in 2011/12, and by 2022/23 it might 
be 39% higher, because of the triple lock. The triple lock ensures adequacy; but it 
comes at some cost, and may not be sustainable.26 27 28 The Government Actuary, 
in the latest quinquennial review of National Insurance Contributions, concluded 
that the NI Fund balance is expected to increase until around 2024-25, without any 
Treasury grants being required but, without additional support in addition to NICs, 
the Fund balance will fall rapidly to exhaustion in around 2032-33. Treasury grants 
would be required from around 2030 but would consistently need to exceed the 
current limits from 2060-61.29 
Trends in health spending 
Health spending increased in real terms from £107 €126 billion in 2005 to £146 €172 billion 
in 2018 (in 2017/18 prices), and from 6.2% in 2005 to 7.1% in 2018 as a share of GDP.30 
The issue is whether this has been sufficient to keep pace with rising demands. 
Charlesworth and Bloor31 have recently asked what metric can be used to determine the 
“right” amount of spending. One is to compare the proportion of GDP spent on health by 
other rich countries and the latest evidence is that the UK matches the average of the 
EU15 and exceeds that of the EU28 and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). However, the UK’s GDP per capita is below the EU15 average, which 
implies that less money per person on average is spent on health. In terms of tangible 
resources and measures of process the UK compares poorly. The UK has below average 
numbers of doctors, nurses, hospital beds, MRI machines, and CT scanners per head. Quite 
sophisticated modelling has been undertaken,32 33 34 35 taking into account the contribution 
of five main factors: population size and age structure, technology, productivity, pay and 
other cost pressures, and the relative priority countries attach to healthcare as they get 
richer. This has concluded that cost pressures are growing at 4% per year. Although this 
is in line with the rate of increase in spending in the 70 years since the NHS was founded, 
it is much higher than rates of health spending increase since 2010. In recent years 
these pressures have been exacerbated by funding constraints not just on the NHS but 
more severely on social care, which is inextricably linked to increasing demands on the 
                                                 
25 http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7812#fullreport  
26 http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/fsr/fiscal-sustainability-report-january-2017/  
27 http://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/press/press-releases/what-level-of-pension-contribution-is-
needed-to-obtain-an-adequate-retirement-income  
28 https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/work-and-pensions-
committee/news-parliament-2015/triple-lock-withdrawal-comment-16-17/  
29 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-actuarys-quinquennial-review-of-the-national-
insurance-fund-as-at-april-2015  
30 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/public-spending-statistics-release-february-2019  
31 Charlesworth, A. and Bloor, K. (2018) ‘70 years of NHS funding: how do we know how much is enough?’ 
BMJ 2018; 361 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k2373 (Published 14 June 2018)  
32 Wanless D. (2002) Securing our future health: taking a long-term view. Final report. HM Treasury. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/consult_wanless_index.htm  
33 NHS England (2014). Five year forward view. https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/5yfv-web.pdf  
34 Maisonneuve, C. and Oliveira Martins, T.J. (2013) ‘A projection method for public health and long-term care 
expenditures’, SSRN Electronic Journal, doi:10.1787/18151973 
Przywara, B. (2010) ‘Projecting future health care expenditure at European level: drivers, methodology and 
main results’. European Commission Economic Papers 417. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2010/pdf/ecp417_en.pdf  
35 Licchetta, M. and Stelmach, M. (2016) Fiscal sustainability analytical paper: fiscal sustainability and public 
spending on health. http://obr.uk/docs/dlm_uploads/Health-FSAP.pdf  
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healthcare system. Process measures that may indicate excess demand, such as breaches 
in mixed sex wards in hospitals and waiting times (in emergency departments and for 
planned surgery) have recently worsened, particularly since 2013-14. Some outcome 
indicators, including life expectancy and infant mortality, are showing signs of worsening, 
although many factors contribute to these trends. Brexit is likely to cause further resource 
constraints, particularly in terms of staff. However, the government has committed to 
spending an extra £20.5 billion €24 (14% over the level of expenditure in 2018) per year 
on the NHS by the end of five years in the context of the NHS Plan. 
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2 Current mix and past changes in the sources of financing social 
protection  
2.1 Revenue 
In the UK social protection is funded out of general tax revenue, if this is defined as 
including NICs. In the tax year starting in April 2019 (2019-2020), the Government 
planned to raise £810 (€855) billion in tax revenue, about a third of Britain’s national 
income.36 The way this is broken down between the various taxes is shown in Table 4, 
which is divided into two parts. It can be seen in Figure 2 that there has been little change 
in tax revenue as a proportion of GDP since 1997. It was 33.2% before the financial crisis 
and it was 33.2% in 2016. 
Table 4: Sources of tax revenue 2019/20 
Direct taxes £ Billion 
Income tax 193 (€227) 
National Insurance contributions 142 (€168) 
Corporation Tax 60 (€71) 
Capital gains tax 9 (€11) 
Inheritance tax 6 (€7) 
Stamp duty 13 (€15) 
Indirect taxes £ Billion 
Value added tax 156 (€184) 
Council Tax 36 (€42) 
Business Rates 31 (€37) 
Fuel duties 28 (€33) 
Tobacco duties 9 (€11) 
Alcohol duties 13 (€15) 
Vehicle excise duties  6 (€7) 
Other taxes 54 (€64) 
Source: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/752202/B
udget_2018_red_web.pdf 
 
                                                 
36 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/752202/Bu
dget_2018_red_web.pdf  
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Figure 2: Total tax revenue as a proportion of GDP 
 
Source: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/data/revenue-statistics/comparative-tables_data-00262-en 
 
In the UK, social protection is mostly funded out of general tax revenues, both direct and 
indirect. National Insurance contributions (NICs) only fund part of social protection and are 
often treated as just another form of taxation.37 They are paid by employed earners, 
employers and self-employed people. To qualify for the state pension and a small number 
of contributory benefits (contributory Job Seeker’s Allowance, contributory Employment 
and Support Allowance, Maternity Allowance and Bereavement Benefit) claimants must 
have a contribution record. To qualify for some statutory payments from employers 
(Statutory Maternity Pay and Statutory Sick Pay), employees’ earnings must also on 
average reach the lower earnings limit, the level at which NICs start to apply (£116 
€137/week) – though a zero rate is applied until earnings reach the primary threshold 
(£162 €191/week).38  
The National Insurance (NI) Fund is made up of contributions from employees, employers 
and the self-employed, and a payment from general taxation from the Treasury (abolished, 
after 1988/89 and then reinstated in 1993/94). These elements can be varied according 
to calls on the Fund and the economic situation; the Treasury contribution in particular 
acts as a flexible element. The level of the Fund is reviewed regularly by the Government 
Actuary.39 However, the level of benefit once someone has qualified for it is now 
independent of contributions paid, except for the remaining earnings-related element of 
the state pension, which is being phased out. Credited contributions can be used in some 
situations to qualify for benefits and are given (for example) when someone is off work ill 
or unemployed. There are also arrangements for caring periods to count towards the state 
pension, though it is no longer possible to inherit one’s pension entitlement via a partner’s 
contributions. As noted, employees earning between the lower earnings limit and the 
primary threshold are treated as though they are paying NICs, but do not do so. For 
employees, there is a lower NIC rate above the upper earnings limit. Self-employed people 
                                                 
37 See https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN04517 for more details 
38 The average wage was £527/week in December 2018, making the lower earnings limit 22% of this.  
39 E.g. see 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748572/Gr
eat_Britain_National_Insurance_Fund_Account_-
_2017_to_2018.pdfhttps://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/748572/Great_Britain_National_Insurance_Fund_Account_-_2017_to_2018.pdf  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
 
 
Financing social protection  United Kingdom 
   
 
14 
 
have a flat-rate NIC, plus profits related NICs up to a certain level and a lower percentage 
rate above that.40 
The National Health Service (NHS) is funded out of general revenue, including NICs, and 
health care is provided free at the point of demand without regard to contributions, though 
part of the National Insurance Fund is diverted to the NHS, and NICs were increased with 
a rationale related to NHS funding by Labour when in office. About one-fifth of NICs 
revenue goes to the NHS.41 In addition, employers are reimbursed out of the NI Fund for 
certain payments (Statutory Maternity Pay, Statutory Adoption Pay, Statutory Paternity 
Pay and Statutory Shared Parental Leave, and until 2014 for smaller employers Statutory 
Sick Pay) that depend on employees qualifying by their average earnings reaching the level 
at which NICs start to apply.42  
So, as discussed above, state provision of social protection including health care in the UK 
is funded out of general taxation (including NICs for some contributory benefits and 
payments from employers). There is no direct link between the structure of financing and 
the benefit or service, except for contributions that count for qualifying for certain 
contributory benefits). There have been many recent changes in the structure of taxation 
and NICs, which are summarised in this section; but they have taken place independently 
of the changes, mainly cuts, to expenditure on social protection. These cuts were said to 
have been designed to contribute to reducing the deficit in the public accounts; but this 
effort was less successful than it might have been, thanks to cuts made in direct taxation 
mainly by raising the income tax threshold. Indeed, researchers found that taking inflation 
into account between 2010 and 2015/15, cuts to benefits were offset by tax cuts.43 
Table 5 summarises the ESSPROS data on the sources of revenue for different elements of 
the UK’s social protection system. Old age and survivors’ benefits are predominantly 
financed from contributions and that share has grown over time. Benefits for family and 
children, housing costs and social exclusion are exclusively funded by general tax revenue. 
Table 6 summarises the ESSPROS data for the UK on financing by social contributions by 
sub-category, between 2005 and 2015. Employers contribute about half the funding for 
old age, survivors and unemployment benefits and very little for health and sickness and 
family and child benefits. 
According to the ESSPROS data,44 in 2005 48.8% of revenue came from social 
contributions, 49.6% from general government contributions and 1.6% from other 
sources. By 2016 the shares had changed, to 38.2% from social contributions,45 48.8% 
from general government contributions and 13.1% from other sources. The share of social 
contributions by employers fell from 34.8% in 2005 to 28.2% in 2016 and the share by 
employees fell from 13.3% to 9.5%. The share of government contributions in 2005 was 
20.8% from earmarked taxes and 28.8% from general government revenue; by 2016, 
48.8% came from general government revenue and nothing from earmarked taxes.46 
  
                                                 
40 https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN04517  
41 https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN04517  
42 https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN04517  
43 Research by John Hills and colleagues at LSE for ‘Social Policy in a Cold Climate’: 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case/_new/research/Social_Policy_in_a_Cold_Climate.asp  
44 "Statistical annex on financing social protection: levels and structure (2005-2016)". 
45 National insurance contributions are currently 12%, and 2% above the upper earnings limit. The employer rate 
is 13.8%. In 2018/19, the lower earnings limit is £116 per week and the upper earnings limit is £892 per week.  
46 Which indicates a classificatory change. 
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Table 5: ESSPROS data on sources of revenue for benefits UK 
  2008 2010 2015 
  Social  
contrib. 
Govt 
revenue 
Other 
receipts 
Social 
contrib. 
Govt 
revenue 
Other 
receipts 
Social 
contrib. 
Govt 
revenue 
Other 
receipts 
Old age 58.5 13.4 28.1 60.7 11.4 27.9 64.2 10.6 25.3 
Health care and 
sickness 
7.1 90.2 2.7 9.3 86.4 4.3 5.6 89.8 4.5 
Survivors 70.0 4.6 25.5 70.8 3.5 25.7 59.4 16.8 23.8 
Disability 26.1 73.8 0.1 24.6 75.3 0.1 16.5 83.4 0.0 
Unemployment 47.5 52.5 0.0 37.5 62.5 0.0 35.4 64.1 0.5 
Family and children 5.9 94.1 0.0 8.1 91.9 0.0 4.9 95.1 0.0 
Housing 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 
Social exclusion 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 
Source: Spasova and Ward (2019), Annex ESSPROS tables. 
 
Table 6: Breakdown of the financing by social contributions by sub-category, 2005-2015 (% of total financing)  
     
  2008 2010 2015 
  Employers Employees Self-
employed 
Benefit 
recipients 
Employers Employees Self-
employed 
Benefit 
recipients 
Employers Employees Self-
employed 
Benefit 
recipients 
Old age 41.6 16.3 0.6 0.0 45.4 14.8 0.5 0.0 46.5 17.0 0.6 0.0 
Health and 
sickness 
6.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 5.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Survivors 52.9 16.4 0.6 0.0 55.7 14.5 0.5 0.0 43.2 15.7 0.6 0.0 
Disability 17.4 8.3 0.5 0.0 16.7 7.4 0.5 0.0 11.1 5.1 0.3 0.0 
Unemployment 43.7 3.5 0.2 0.1 34.4 2.8 0.2 0.1 33.8 1.5 0.1 0.0 
Family and 
children 
3.5 2.3 0.1 0.0 4.7 3.1 0.2 0.0 2.9 1.9 0.1 0.0 
 Source: Spasova and Ward (2019), Annex ESSPROS tables. 
  
 
 
Financing social protection  United Kingdom 
   
 
16 
 
Direct taxes, which depend on the circumstances – mostly the incomes or profits – of 
individual taxpayers or companies account for more than half the total, with income tax 
the single biggest contributor. Indirect taxes are charged on particular kinds of spending; 
the most important of these is Value Added Tax (VAT). 
The best source of data on the impact of direct and indirect taxes is the Office for National 
Statistics series The effects of taxes and benefits on household incomes,47 produced each 
year since 1977. Note that the analysis here is at the household, not the individual, level. 
Figures 3-5 show the percentage of gross income paid in taxes by each decile group (from 
the lowest 10% of households, Decile 1, to the highest 10% of households, Decile 10). The 
figures are presented for three years: 2007/08, just before the financial crisis; 2010/11, 
at the change of government; and the latest, 2016/17. A distinction is made between direct 
taxes and contributions – income tax, NICs and Council Tax - and indirect taxes - VAT, 
duties and Intermediate taxes.48 
The first thing to note is how flat the distribution is – beyond the first decile, households 
are paying about the same proportion of their gross income in tax regardless of their 
income. The tax system in the UK is proportional rather than vertically progressive. (The 
results for the first decile are possibly misleading for two reasons – first, income is not 
always reliably reported at the bottom end of the distribution, and second, and relatedly, 
there are self-employed households under-reporting their incomes but having higher levels 
of consumption and hence indirect taxes.) 
The second thing to note is that income tax and NICs are progressive taxes and council 
tax and the indirect taxes are regressive taxes. The redistributive effects of the two types 
of taxes cancel each other out. 
Thirdly, there is very little evidence here of changes in the overall average incidence of the 
tax and NICs system over these ten years - despite the many changes in tax rates and 
allowances made in successive Budgets over the period (see Section 2). A household 
without children would pay an average of 36% of its gross income in tax in 2007/08, 35% 
in 2010/11 and 35% in 2016/17. There is evidence of a very slight shift from direct to 
indirect taxation as a proportion of the tax paid. A household without children would have 
paid an average of 56% of their total tax bill in income tax and NICs in 2007/08, 54% in 
2010/11 and 54% in 2016/17.  
These charts are for non-retired households without children; but there are no differences 
in the taxes paid by households with and without children, because children are no longer 
recognised in the tax system. The benefit and tax credit systems take account of some of 
the costs of rearing children. However, the high-income child benefit tax charge means 
that, if child benefit is not given up by the partner claiming it in a household in which there 
is someone on ‘adjusted net income’ of £50,000 €59,00 per year or more, additional 
income tax will be paid, up to the value of child benefit received at £60,000 €70,800 per 
year. 
                                                 
47 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/data
sets/theeffectsoftaxesandbenefitsonhouseholdincomefinancialyearending2014  
48 Indirect taxes on intermediate goods and services include: rates on commercial and industrial property, 
motor vehicle duties, duties on hydrocarbon oils, employers' contributions to National Insurance, the National 
Health Service (NHS), the industrial injuries fund and the redundancy payments scheme, customs (import) 
duties, stamp duties, VAT (on the intermediate stages of exempt goods), Independent Commission franchise 
payments, landfill tax, Consumer Credit Act fees, bank levy. For more information on the methodology see 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/articles/theeffectsoftaxesandbenef
itsonhouseholdincome/technicalreport 
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Figure 3: 2007-2008 Non-retired households no children. % of gross income 
paid in tax 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using Office for National Statistics, The effects of taxes and benefits on household 
incomes, 2007/08. 
 
Figure 4: 2010-2011 Non-retired households no children % of gross income 
paid in tax 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using Office for National Statistics, The effects of taxes and benefits on household 
incomes, 2010/11. 
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Figure 5: 2016-2017 Non-retired households no children % of gross income 
paid in tax 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using Office for National Statistics, The effects of taxes and benefits on household 
incomes, 2016/17. 
 
The UK is not a high tax country comparatively. The proportion of GDP taken in tax is below 
the international average. The UK also has one of the lowest proportions of total tax taken 
in direct taxes. The top rate of income and social security taxes is one of the lowest and 
the starting rate is one of the highest in the OECD. The tax rates in the UK are middling 
and less progressive than many other countries. The UK has the second lowest corporation 
tax rate in the OECD. The standard rate of VAT is comparatively low.49 
2.2 What has happened to the UK tax system since the financial crisis? 
Social protection is funded out of general taxation – that is, any and all of the taxes listed 
in Table 4 above. In summary, there are three big taxes – income tax, NICs and value 
added tax. The overall impact of these taxes is proportionate. The progressive nature of 
direct taxes - income tax and NICs - is wiped out by the regressive nature of Council Tax 
and indirect taxes. Taxation makes a very limited contribution to horizontal equity; this is 
left to social security policy. There is very little evidence of changes in the impact of tax 
since 2007/08; but there has been a very slight shift from direct to indirect tax. 
There was a rapid increase in inequality in income before taxes in the 1980s; but the 
distribution has remained more or less stable since then. Inequality in original income is 
most unequal. Adding cash benefits reduces it substantially, as does deducting direct taxes. 
Adding indirect taxes cancels out the effect of direct taxes. The quintile shares of income 
have not changed much since 2005/06. In 2016/17, the top quintile has a final income 
after taking account of benefits, all taxes and the value of services in kind, four times that 
of the bottom quintile. After adjusting for household type, the top decile has an equivalent 
household income eight times that of the bottom decile.  
The UK is not a high tax country comparatively. The proportion of GDP taken in tax is below 
the international average. The UK also has one of the lowest proportions of total tax taken 
in direct taxes. The top rate of income and social security taxes is one of the lowest and 
the starting rate is one of the highest in the OECD. The tax rates in the UK are middling 
and less progressive than many other countries. The UK has the second lowest corporation 
tax rate in the OECD. The standard rate of VAT is comparatively low. 
 
                                                 
49 See Bradshaw, J. (2019) ‘International comparisons’, in J. Bradshaw (ed.) Let’s Talk about Tax, London: 
Child Poverty Action Group (forthcoming) 
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There have been many changes to the rates and thresholds of taxes since the financial 
crisis.50 In this section we will only comment on NICs. 
National insurance contributions (NICs) 
NICS is the only element that is directly related to social protection. In 2007/08, the lower 
earnings limit for NICs was £87 €103 per week and the upper earnings limit was £670 
€791 per week. The class 1 employee contribution rate was 11%, and 1% above the upper 
earnings limit, and the employer’s contribution was 12.8% on all earnings above the lower 
earnings limit. By 2010/11, the lower earnings limit was £97 €70.8 and the upper earnings 
limit £844 €996 per week. The contribution rates were unchanged. Under the Coalition 
Government, the lower earnings limit was increased progressively to £111 €131 per week 
in 2014/15; but the upper earnings limit was reduced to £805 €950. All the rates were 
increased – to 12%, and 2% above the upper earnings limit - and the employer rate was 
increased to 13.8%. In 2018/19, the thresholds are £116 €137 and £892 €1052 per week, 
with the NIC rates unchanged. However, changes introduced by Labour mean NICs are 
now not payable by employees until the primary threshold is reached.51 This is £162 €192 
per week in 2018/19. Employees earning between the lower earnings limit and the primary 
threshold are treated as if they were paying NICs. 
This threshold of £162 €192 per week (2018/19) is also when employers start paying NICs. 
(Employers with apprentices or young employees pay zero rates up to the upper earnings 
limit.) For the last few years the government has given a flat-rate reduction of NICs to 
employers, now of £3,000 €3540,52 with the aim of stimulating additional employment 
creation. 
The lower rate for those in contracted-out pensions no longer exists since 2016/17. This is 
due to phasing out any state earnings-related pension with the new state pension scheme. 
Self-employed people pay very low flat-rate contributions (Class 2) once their profits reach 
a certain level,53 and Class 4 NICs on higher profits.54 Class 4 NICs paid by self-employed 
people with profits over £8,424 €9940 for the year do not usually count towards state 
benefits. 
Following a review of self-employment in 2016,55 the government proposed abolishing 
Class 2 NICs, and introducing a different way of qualifying for NI benefits involving Class 
4 NICs and voluntary NICs. However, having postponed this, it then abandoned it.56 In the 
2017 Budget, the Chancellor proposed to increase the Class 4 NICs rate for the self-
employed to bring them more in line with employees’ NICs. This was in part because the 
self-employed will gain disproportionately from the new state pension, and in part in 
response to concerns about ‘bogus’ self-employment in response to lower taxes and NICs,57 
as well as a potential extension of parental leave rights to self-employed people. The 
Chancellor also referred to the need to ensure sustainability of the tax base. Most 
commentators agreed this was a sensible move. However, outrage from the government’s 
                                                 
50 For a summary, see Bradshaw, J. and Ohrnial, T. (2019) ‘What has happened to the tax system since 2010?’, 
in J. Bradshaw (ed.) Let’s Talk about Tax, London: Child Poverty Action Group (forthcoming) 
51 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rates-and-allowances-national-insurance-contributions/rates-
and-allowances-national-insurance-contributions  
52 https://www.gov.uk/claim-employment-allowance  
53 Now paid together with Class 4 NICs in the annual tax return rather than every quarter 
54 See Seely, A (2018), ‘National insurance contributions (NICs) and the self-employed’, Briefing paper no. 
7918, London: House of Commons Library: 
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7918  
55 Deane, J, 2016, Self-employment review: An independent report, London: UK Government, 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/self-employment-review  
56 House of Commons Hansard, Written Statement HCWS944, 6 September 2018, 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-
statement/Commons/2018-09-06/HCWS944/  
57 See, for example, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmworpen/847/847.pdf  
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own supporters as well as the tabloid press resulted in these proposals being dropped,58 
though the official HM Treasury line is that they are delayed “to ensure that there is enough 
time to work with Parliament and stakeholders on the detail of reforms”.59 
The more restricted entitlement to NI benefits, and reductions in their level in relation to 
average earnings, have led to the contributory benefits system being described as giving 
‘nothing for something’ to many people.60 This is exacerbated by the recent real increases 
in the personal tax allowance, not matched by similar increases in the NI threshold. 
With the abolition of any earnings-related element of the state pension, there has been 
concern about insufficient saving towards private pensions. This has led to the introduction 
of auto enrolment,61 phased in by size of employer from 2012. Employees not already in 
an occupational pension scheme but earning over a certain amount pay a low level of 
contributions towards a pension scheme unless they choose to opt out. The employer pays 
a matching contribution (3% from April 2019, with employees paying 8% from then). A 
review in 201762 said that 9 million individuals had been auto-enrolled, with 9 out of 10 
continuing to save, though the impact of increasing contribution rates is not yet known, 
and the redistributive element of the state earnings-related pension scheme is absent. 
Proposals for reforms to auto enrolment are intended to be implemented in the mid-2020s. 
In the meantime, private insurance companies are suggesting that auto enrolment is a 
good model for widespread private insurance to be introduced for employees. 
 
  
                                                 
58 Bennett, F. (forthcoming) ‘Social protection for the self-employed in the UK: the disappearing contributions 
increase’, Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 
59 Para 3.10 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/661480/au
tumn_budget_2017_web.pdf  
60 https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/contributory_benefits.pdf  
61 https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06417; for background see 
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN04847  
62 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/automatic-enrolment-review-2017-maintaining-the-
momentum  
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3. Strengths and weaknesses of the existing mix of financing 
options and potential future sources of financing - national 
debate on the topic (if any)  
The major problems facing social protection at present relate not only to the mix but also 
to the level of taxation, due to the political decision made in 2010 to reduce the deficit 
largely by cutting expenditure rather than by increasing taxes. The consequences of this 
strategy are now being felt in rising poverty, growing homelessness, worsening health 
outcomes, longer waiting lists, increased dependence on food banks and so on. As the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights said in his visit in November 
2018: 
“The UK Government’s policies and drastic cuts to social support are entrenching 
high levels of poverty and inflicting unnecessary misery in one of the richest 
countries in the world. The Government has remained in a state of denial, and 
ministers insisted to me that all is well and running according to plan. Despite 
making some reluctant tweaks to basic policy, there has been a determined 
resistance to change in response to the many problems which so many people at 
all levels have brought to my attention.”63  
In order to tackle the problem of child poverty and a struggling health service, as well as 
a totally inadequate social protection system, the UK needs to spend more. In the case 
of social protection, the freeze in benefit levels for most working age benefits must be lifted 
and the two-child limit, the benefit cap and the ‘bedroom tax’64 abolished, rent limits for 
housing benefit for private tenants raised and the other cuts to working age benefits 
reversed. The health service needs more resources year on year. To achieve this calls for 
increases in general tax revenue. 
The UK’s tax system is currently an accretion of improvised tinkering that is impossible to 
defend on any principled basis.65 There are some debates about ‘big’ reforms. One is the 
suggestion that a hypothecated tax should be introduced to, for example, fund the health 
service,66 on the basis that this might enable taxes to be increased without political costs.67 
At least one health economist thinks this is a silly idea.68  
There has been debate about aligning the income tax and NICs system for some time, 
primarily from the point of view of simplifying administration for employers, although the 
Office for Tax Simplification has also argued that NICs no longer reflect the structure of 
the modern labour market.69 Sometimes, however, this debate seems to stem from a view 
that NICs are just another form of taxation, which is contested.70 (Employers could 
arguably also pay NICs as a simpler payroll levy.) There is also a common view that NICs 
are not paid into a separate fund to support social insurance benefits, which is in fact the 
case. According to the Mirrlees review of taxation, “NI is not a true social insurance 
scheme; it is just another tax on earnings, and the current system invites politicians to 
                                                 
63 Press release at the end of the visit of Philip Alston to the UK as the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty and Human Rights, 16 November 2018. 
64 Called by the government the abolition of the spare room subsidy in social housing 
65 Johnson, P. (2014) ‘Tax without Design: Recent Developments in UK Tax Policy’, Fiscal Studies, vol. 35, no. 
3, pp. 243–273 (2014) 0143-5671 
66 Perhaps a designated element of National Insurance Contributions, to be named National Health Service 
Contributions, for example. 
67 The Commission on Taxation and Citizenship (2000) in Paying for Progress: The politics of tax for public 
spending, London: Fabian Society argued the case for and against a hypothecated tax for the NHS 
68 https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2018/03/29/john-appleby-a-dedicated-tax-to-fund-the-nhs-a-zombie-policy-
idea/. See also https://www.bmj.com/content/356/bmj.j471 and  
https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/2018-05/Hypothecated_funding_Kings_Fund_May_2018.pdf 
69 Office for Tax Simplification (2016), The closer alignment of income tax and national insurance, 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/closer-alignment-of-income-tax-and-national-insurance-contributions  
70 See, for example, McKay, S. (forthcoming, 2019) in J. Bradshaw (ed.), Let’s talk about tax, London: Child 
Poverty Action Group 
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play games with NICs”. As noted above, there is a NI Fund, which can only be spent on 
contributory benefits, though there is no governance of this by the social partners. 
Another big idea is that a basic income scheme should replace the whole system of tax 
allowances and benefits.71 This is supported both from the Left and the Right,72 and in 
the UK the Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell is said to be studying the possibility.73 There 
are also many critics.74 Scotland will be experimenting with a basic income in certain local 
areas soon. Four areas will explore the feasibility of local pilots. The Scottish Government 
confirmed in May 2018 that it would provide £250,000 €295,000over two years to support 
this.75 Proposals for a partial rather than a full basic income have also been put forward 
recently.76 
There are many more straightforward opportunities for reforming the existing tax 
structure, making it more progressive and raising more revenue. There is no space in this 
report to discuss these in detail, but a shortlist of ten might include the following:77 
1. Do not keep raising the income tax threshold in real terms – it benefits higher rate 
tax payers most and does nothing to help people with no earnings or incomes below 
the (constantly increasing) threshold. Introduce a lower starting rate and a more 
graduated set of rates. 
2. Consider removing or increasing the upper earnings limit on National Insurance 
contributions (whilst noting that this reduces still further the idea of NICs as social 
insurance contributions, given the flat-rate nature of UK benefits). Bring the 
treatment of employees and self-employed people closer together, in terms of how 
their contributions relate to the benefits they can qualify for, and the impact on 
their incomes. Increase the NICS tax base by incorporating all incomes of those in 
employment, including the earnings of pensioners. Introduce an equivalent impost 
on income from savings and capital gains. Remove the NICS exemptions for ‘salary 
sacrifice’ schemes. 
3. Remove the freeze on fuel duty. 
4. Increase Corporation Tax rates. Tax all profits of international companies’ sales 
in the UK. 
5. Grasp the nettle of rate revaluation and enable council tax to become more 
progressive. 
6. Introduce a net wealth tax. 
                                                 
71 See Bennett, F. (2017) ‘Universal basic income far from reality of UK’s existing social security system’, ESPN 
Flash Report 2017/19, ESPN: https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=17531&langId=en  
72 See, from the Left, Van Parijs, P. (1991) ‘Why Surfers Should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional 
Basic Income’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 101-131; and Van Parijs, P. and Vanderborght, Y. 
(2017) Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy, Harvard University Press. And 
from the Right: Charles Murray (2006), Guaranteed Income as a Replacement for the Welfare State, Oxford: 
Foundation for Law, Justice and Society 
73 E.g. see The Guardian, 11 March 2019: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/11/scrap-tax-free-
personal-allowance-and-pay-everyone-48-a-week  
74 Marsh, A. (2019) ‘Direct taxes and cash benefits: effects and reforms’ in Bradshaw, J. (ed.) Let’s talk about 
tax, London: Child Poverty Action Group; Piachaud, D. (2018) ‘Basic income: confusion, claims and choices’, 
Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 26(3): 299-314. The Institute for Policy Research at Bath University has 
modelled different versions of a basic income, e.g. see https://www.bath.ac.uk/publications/assessing-the-
case-for-a-universal-basic-income-in-the-uk/  
75 https://basicincome.scot/whats-happening-scotland/. See also   
https://basicincome.scot/2019/02/01/exploring-the-practicalities-of-a-basic-income-pilot-a-report-by-the-
scottish-citizens-basic-income-steering-group/  
76 https://basicincome.org/news/2018/11/a-partial-basic-income-as-a-response-to-our-society-widening-
inequality/  
77 These and others are discussed in Bradshaw, J. (ed.) (forthcoming, 2019) Let’s talk about tax, London: Child 
Poverty Action Group. 
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7. Tackle tax evasion. Close tax avoidance loopholes. 
8. Recognise child benefit as a means of achieving at least some degree of horizontal 
equity in the tax system – which means abolishing the High Income Child Benefit 
Charge. If better-off people should pay more tax, this should include those without 
children as well as those who are currently bringing them up. Abolish the 
transferable tax allowance for married couples and civil partners, which unlike child 
benefit is not granted in recognition of genuine dependence.  
9. Tax gains arising from disposal of main residence. 
10. Abolish inheritance tax reliefs and non-domiciled loopholes. Introduce a Lifetime 
Receipts Tax to replace Inheritance Tax.  
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